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Secured Hardware Design – An Overview
Sasikiran Burugapalli and Waleed K. Al-Assadi, Senior Member, IEEE
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
Missouri University of Science and Technology
Rolla, MO 65409-0040
Abstract-Security is a prime concern in the design of a wide
variety of embedded systems and security processors. So the
customer security devices such as smart cards and security
processors are prone to attack and there are on going research
to protect these devices from attackers who intend to extract
key information from these devices. Also an active attacker can
induce errors during computation and exploit the faulty result
to extract the key information embedded in the processor. Due
to the design time issues weakness in the design is often
revealed in the manufactured chips. Also because the postmanufacture security evaluation is time consuming and
expensive, these security issues have to be considered at the
design phase. This paper outlines some of the hardware attacks
and provides a general idea of the process of these attacks.

Keywords: Hardware Attack, Optical Probing, Thermal
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Similar to the virus attacks on the software, hardware can
also be attacked by either insertion of the malicious logic
into the circuit or by the malicious attack on the integrated
circuit. Malicious logic can be inserted at different levels of
abstraction in the supply chain architecture of the
semiconductor IC. Also these days most of the complex
digital circuits use third party Intellectual property (IP)
blocks, instead of designing the circuit from the scratch
which saves lots of work and time [1]. These IP blocks are
themselves are untrustable as they may contain malicious
code incorporated into them thus affecting the trustability of
the entire system. Also another source of malicious logic
injection is through the CAD tools which were used to
design the hardware. These CAD tools themselves may
contain software virus or a bug which will insert the
malicious logic into the design.
Further more many opportunities exist for the
introduction of the unwanted features into the IC during the
design cycle [3]. Although some of the phases in the supply
chain structure of an ASIC design are trusted due to the fact
that they are under the designer’s control, most of the
phases are untrusted. So it is up to the end user to rely on
the trustability of the hardware.
The malicious logic can lead to various unwanted
scenarios like causing the system to output data to the
wrong port or address (information leakage), monitoring

and modifying the system’s output data (tampering), or
disabling the system by changing the system’s internal
timing or control, e.g., holding the clock or bus (denial of
service). All these can be done by changing or adding
internal logic in such a way that it is very unlikely to be
detected by traditional testing and verification tools and
techniques [2].

Fig. 1: ASIC design flow [3]

Different types of malicious logics are Trojan horse, trap
door, logic bomb etc. A Trojan horse when invoked covertly
performs some other action while performing its intended
action, while a trap door is a secret entry into the program
that allows some one who is aware of it to gain access to the
program with out actually passing through the usual security
procedures and logic bomb is a piece of code embedded in a
legitimate program which becomes active at a predefined
time or if a certain event is occurred.
As the technology is ever growing the usage of small
hand held security devices is ubiquitous and they rely on a
greater extent on the tamper resistance property of these
devices. However these tamper resistance is not outright.
An attacker having access to the semiconductor test
equipment can easily retrieve the key information in the
chip by any of the methods wide known. It was believed
that given sufficient investment any chip can be tampered.
So the level of tamper resistance offered by any chip is can
be measured by the time and cost penalty. A number of less
expensive attack techniques are also known [14].
In this paper we discussed various types of hardware
attack techniques and possible remedies proposed by
authors.
II.

TYPES OF ATTACKS

A. Soft Errors
In earlier days chip manufacturing components contains
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small amounts of radioactive contaminants. The decay of
these contaminants cause the soft errors due to the emission
of high energy particles like alpha particles. The other
sources of soft errors are neutrons, cosmic rays etc. when
these high energy particles interact with the semiconductor
electron-hole pairs will be generated. For an alpha particle
is interacted with silicon, an energy of 3.6 eV is lost for
every electron hole pair created [4] thus causing charge
deposition. The number of electron hole pairs created
depends on the energy of the sub atomic particle. Transistor
source and diffusion nodes can collect these charges. If the
charge collected is sufficiently high then that may invert the
state of a logic device such as an SRAM cell, a latch, or a
gate thereby introducing a logical fault into the circuit’s
operation. [5].

it requires depackaging of the chick like invasive attacks but
the passivation layer remains intact and because this method
does not require electrical contact to the silicon and hence
there is no mechanical damage to the silicon [8]. Laser
radiations can ionize the IC’s semiconductor region if the
photonic energy is greater than the band gap of the
semiconductor. So by precisely focusing the Laser on to an

Impact on circuits [6]
An error due to a hit of a single particle was termed a
single event upset (SEU). Its effects are temporary that lasts
about 100ps and may corrupt the data stored and computed.
For example consider an SRAM memory cell as shown in
fig. 2. When the word line is low, the data will be stored in
the cell using the inverters which are connected back-back.
Now if an energetic particle strikes the cell and causes to
flip one of the nodes, which in turn will be propagated to the
other node causing both nodes to flip through a regenerative
action. This way the data in the memory cell will be
changes and the only way to get back to original state is to
rewrite the content through the bit lines and this is not an
ideal solution.

appropriately selected transistor on the chip, its state can be
changed and there by corrupting the data stored. For
example consider an attack on the typical SRAM memory.
A standard depackaging procedure is applied on the chip to
expose the SRAM memory and the results of depackaging
are as shown in Fig. 3 [8].
Now using a probing station the laser light can be focused
very precisely on a precisely selected SRAM cell
(magnified to about x1500) and the final state of the cell
depends on the exposed layer. So by this way any individual
bit of the SRAM cell can be changed. In other words, laser
is used to induce a transient fault in one or more gates in
such a way as to cause information leakage.
These days this is the most powerful attack because
unlike a glitch attack, the attacker can choose the location of
the attack very precisely [13].

Fig. 2 : SRAM Cell

Soft errors can also be caused due to a particle interaction
on the bit lines. In DRAM, in addition to the cell and bit line
failure modes, another mode called combined cell bitline
(CCB) failure mode is observed [7]. It was seen when both
the cell and bitline collects the charge induced by the
radiation but is insufficient to cause a SEU. Medium and
Low end servers are largely affected by this soft error
problem.
B. Optical probing
Optical probing is a semi-invasive method, which means

Fig. 3: Microcontroller before and after depackaging.

C. Electromagnetic attack [9]
Electromagnetic induction can be used to scan the data in
the semiconductor. For this a miniature inductor can be built
by wrapping several hundred turns of fine wire around the
tip of the microprobe needle. When a current in injected into
this coil, a magnetic field which is concentrated around the
needle of the microprobe is generated. Now eddy current
can be generated on the memory element when this test
probe is placed a few microns over the surface of the
element. These local currents in turn can be used to create
faults. A map of the chip can be created by sensing this
eddy current using an eddy current sensor [10]. A small
perturbation on the memory cell using the same sensor is
created to move the polarization point of the transistor a
little [9]. Depending on the intensity of current required by
the memory element to return to the initial value of the
polarization point, the zero and one states can be identified.
D. Thermal attack [11]
Security processors handle very sensitive information
which was not supposed to be read out or changed by any
one. So these processors employ a volatile memory to store
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this fragile information. On detection of a tampering attack
these memory chips are powered down so that it can not be
read by an attacker. But the problem here is if the data
retention time of the chip is longer than the time taken by
the attacker to read out the data, then obviously the sole
purpose of security processor is doomed.
The data retention time of the SRAM depends on the
temperature. It was believed that at about -20ºC the data in
the memory element is frozen which can be retrieved by the
attacker. So some devices are designed with temperature
sensing equipment which interprets any temperatures lower
then -20ºC as a tampering event and shuts down the
memory cell, there by erasing the secret keys stored. So an
attacker who can get access to this location can subject the
process to a lower temperature and causing the entire
system to power down there by incurring heavy loss to the
organization. Another point that has to be taken into
consideration is that the data retention time in these
processors depends on the temperature, i.e. the lower the
temperature the greater the data retention period.
Experiments proved that when a DRAM is subjected to a
temperature of liquid nitrogen, the data decay is only 0.17%
when isolated from the power [18]
E. Glitch attack
Clock signal glitches are currently the simplest and most
practical glitch attacks. An attacker intentionally increases
the clock frequency temporarily so that some flip-flops at
the slower portion of the circuit fail to respond thus causing
an error. This is particularly used to attack some part of the
circuit because of different number of gate delays in various
paths of the circuit. The effect of the attack depends on the
timing and the duration of the glitch. For example in a CPU
generally the program logic is much simpler than the
instruction unit [15]. So any increase in the frequency
causes instruction cycle to skip and instruction execution.
This skipped instruction can be precisely chosen to be a
password verification step or rather a crucial step. So by this
way an attacker with a malicious intention can get access to
valuable data. In addition these glitch attacks can reduce the
run time of the cryptographic algorithm, so that the cipher
can be decrypted easily [15].

layer is deposited on top of the actual circuit so that this
metal layer can act as a sensor mesh. All the paths in the
sensor mesh are continuously monitored for any interruption
and short circuits [11]. This prevents selective etching and
laser cutting accessing the bus which contains data. When
an interruption or a short circuit is detected, mesh alarm can
be triggered and countermeasures are initialized. Such
meshes also make the penetration to the lower levels very
difficult and thus complicating automatic reconstruction of
the chip. But there are some limitations for using these
sensor meshes as explained by [11].
Another defense approach proposed is chip coating. In
this approach, a top layer metal shield is used to reflect the
incident light thus making optical attack more difficult.
Light sensors can also be used to detect a de-capsulated chip
and prevent it from functioning.
Mitigation techniques for single event upsets are
classified as system-level methods (error detection and
correction, lockstep execution, and redundant systems) and
circuit level methods (radiation hardened circuits). The
disadvantage of these techniques is they increase the
transistor count and the area overhead [17] and this is
because of the presence of additional circuitry on the chip.
Another error correction design called Built-in soft error
resilience (BISER) effectively overcomes this area overhead
problem by utilizing the on chip resources such as on-chip
scan design-for-testability for soft-error protection during
normal operation [19].
The technique to protect from non-invasive attack is by
using randomized clock signal. To protect the circuit from
timing attacks the internal clock is driven by a random bitsequencer which in turn is driven by an external clock. It is
also necessary for the processor to show an even
characteristic current activity during the delay phases of the
random clock else it is possible to construct the internal
clock from the consumed current [11].
The suggested counter measure for the thermal attack is
to redesign the SRAM that looses their state quickly when
the power is removed even at lower temperatures. Another
approach is to scatter the vital information such as
passwords and crypto keys while storing in the RAM.
IV.

F. Timing attack
Timing attack exploits the fact that the execution time of
the cryptographic computation depends on the data that was
being computed. So by analyzing the time taken by this
computation the crypto key can be inferred [12, 16]. Since
the instructions take a different number of cycles depending
on the data inputs, a wide range of timing data is collected
and analyzed to infer the crypto key [12].
III.

COUNTERMEASURES

Similar to electrical fencing protection for houses, a metal

CONCLUSION

In this paper we analyzed various ways in which the
malicious attacks can be performed on the embedded
hardware. We also presented a basis which makes
microcontrollers easy to penetrate and gather required
information. We also presented some counter measures
along with their limitations. Although some of the attacks
like soft errors which may not be controlled completely at
the design phase of the hardware, counter measures for most
of the other attacks were widely available and can be
implemented considering the tradeoffs associated with the
development of particularly robust and secure hardware.
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Because the post-manufacture security evaluation is time
consuming and expensive a proper security protocol has to
be considered at the design level of the hardware.
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